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DUE PROCESS: APPLICATION OF THE PARRATT DOCTRINE
TO RANDOM AND UNAUTHORIZED DEPRIVATIONS OF
LIFE AND LIBERTY
INTRODucTION
In Parratt v. Taylor,' respondent Taylor, an inmate in a Nebraska
state prison, had ordered a hobby kit by mail.2 Because Taylor was in
administrative segregation when the kit arrived, the prison staff ac-
cepted it.3 By negligently failing to follow the established procedures
for acceptance, however, the staff lost the kit. 4 Taylor sued the prison
warden, under section 1983, 5 for deprivation of property without due
process. 6
The Supreme Court held that suit under section 1983 was not
permissible because no constitutional violation7-specifically, no vio-
lation of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause-had oc-
curred." Although convinced that the kit constituted property within
1. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
2. Id. at 529.
3. Id. at 530.
4. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). Section 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id.
6. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 530.
7. Section 1983 confers no substantive rights on plaintiffs. Maher v. Gagne, 448
U.S. 122, 129 n.11 (1980); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 238 n.16 (1979);
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979); Dollar v.
Haralson County, Ga., 704 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 399
(1983); Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556, 559 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983). Rather, it
allows only suits based on violations of the Constitution or federal laws. Parratt, 451
U.S. at 535; Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979); Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 1981).
8. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1.
9. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44. The Supreme Court in recent years has decided
several other cases involving claimed deprivations of property or liberty without due
process in violation of the fourteenth amendment. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The mode of
analysis employed in deciding Parratt and these cases reveals that the Court views the
due process clause as primarily a guarantee of procedural regularity. See Parratt, 451
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the meaning of the due process clause, that Taylor had been negli-
gently deprived of that property, and that the deprivation had oc-
curred under color of state law, 10 the Court held that Taylor had an
available remedy under the Nebraska Tort Claims Act" capable of
fully compensating him for the loss, and therefore, sufficient to satisfy
due process.12 The Parratt doctrine thus stands for the proposition that
when an interest protected by the due process clause is jeopardized, a
predeprivation hearing must be held if practicable.13 When, however,
there can be no predeprivation hearing, either because immediate
action by the state is required to protect vital public interests or
because the deprivation could not have been predicted, postdepriva-
tion remedies under state law may be sufficient to satisfy due proc-
ess.
14
The effect of denying a plaintiff the opportunity to bring suit under
section 1983 is significant. Suit under section 1983, "a uniquely fed-
eral remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state
law upon rights secured by the Constitution,"'1 5 allows for jury trial, 16
attorney's fees for the prevailing party, 7 and punitive damages when
appropriate. 8 These may be unavailable to plaintiffs suing under
U.S. at 552 (Powell, J., concurring); Paul, 424 U.S. at 710-11; Kupfer, Restructuring
the Monroe Doctrine: Current Litigation Under Section 1983, 9 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 463, 471-72 (1982); Note, Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-Negligent Injury
by the State is Not Cognizable Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 When the State
Provides Adequate Tort Claims Procedure, 56 Tul. L. Rev. 1441, 1450 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Negligent Injury].
10. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536-37.
11. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,209 to -8,239 (1981).
12. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44.
13. See id. at 537-38.
14. Id. at 539; see, e.g., Love v. Coughlin, 714 F.2d 207, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1983)
(per curiam); Wilkins v. Whitaker, 714 F.2d 4, 6-7 (4th Cir. 1983); Moore v.
Gluckstern, 548 F. Supp. 165, 167 (D. Md. 1982); Whorley v. Karr, 534 F. Supp. 88,
90 (W.D. Va. 1981); Ragusa v. Streator Police Dep't, 530 F. Supp. 814, 816 (N.D.
Ill. 1981); Graham v. Mitchell, 529 F. Supp. 622, 626 (E.D. Va. 1982); cf. Slade v.
Petrovsky, 528 F. Supp. 99, 101 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (fifth amendment due process case).
15. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972).
16. The seventh amendment provides in part: "In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved." U.S. Const. amend. VII; see C. Wright, Federal Courts § 92 (4th ed.
1983); cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (jury trial available in Bivens
action).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V. 1981); see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9
(1980); Lynn v. City of New Orleans Dep't of Police, 567 F. Supp. 761, 766 (E.D.
La. 1983); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 624 (D. Mass. 1982).
18. E.g., Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29 (1983); Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 22 (1980); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 & n.11, 266 (1978); Clark v.
Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 14 (1st Cir. 1983); Grimm v. Leinart, 705 F.2d 179, 182 (6th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3626 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1984) (No. 83-1054); Lynn
v. City of New Orleans Dep't of Police, 567 F. Supp. 761, 765-66 (E.D. La. 1983);
Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 622 (D. Mass. 1982).
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state tort law. 19 Nevertheless, provided state remedies are adequate to
compensate plaintiffs for their losses, the requirements of due process
are satisfied.2 0
The Parratt doctrine has been applied consistently when plaintiffs
have been deprived of property, 2' but when the deprivation has in-
volved life or liberty, the results have not been as consistent. 22 For
example, assume that a court is faced with a physical injury caused by
the negligent actions of a police officer. Such negligence violates no
specific provision of the Bill of Rights,2 3 but would amount to a
19. The seventh amendment right to trial by jury does not apply to the states.
Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916); Letendre v.
Fugate, 701 F.2d, 1093, 1094 (4th Cir. 1983); Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp.
1025, 1048 (E.D. La.), ajff'd sub nom. Hill v. McKeithen, 409 U.S. 943 (1972); seeJ.
Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 413 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as J. Nowak]. Punitive damages may be unavailable under state
law. Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 879 n.19 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 908 comment f (1979); Note, Defining the Parameters of
Section 1983: Parratt v. Taylor, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 1219, 1224 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Parameters]; see Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 615, 624 (D. Mass. 1982);
Vinson v. Freeman, 524 F. Supp. 63, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Friedman, Parratt v.
Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on Section 1983, 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 545,
573 (1982); Attorney's fees are typically unavailable under state law. Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 914 (1979); Kupfer, supra note 9, at 468; Parameters, supra, at
24.
20. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544; Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797 (4th Cir.
1983); Graham v. Mitchell, 529 F. Supp. 622, 626 (E.D. Va. 1982); Vinson v.
Freeman, 524 F. Supp. 63, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Smolla, The Displacement of Federal
Due Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Company, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 831, 858; Parameters, supra note 19, at
1239; see Note, Federalism, Section 1983 and State Law Remedies: Curtailing the
Federal Civil Rights Docket by Restricting the Underlying Right, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
1035, 1062-63 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Civil Rights Docket]; cf. Cline v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 525 F. Supp 825, 828 (D.S.D. 1981) (Federal Tort Claims Act
adequate to redress property deprivation despite unavailability of jury trial or puni-
tive damages).
21. See, e.g., Love v. Coughlin, 714 F.2d 207, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1983) (per
curiam); Wilkins v. Whitaker, 714 F.2d 4, 6-7 (4th Cir. 1983); Tigner v. State of
N.Y. Comm'r of Dep't of Corrections, 559 F. Supp. 25, 27 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Brown
v. Brienen, 553 F. Supp. 561, 564-66 (C.D. Ill. 1982); Buck v. Village of Minooka,
552 F. Supp. 298, 300 (N.D. Ill. 1982); McCulloch v. County of Washoe, 551 F.
Supp. 1022, 1023-24 (D. Nev. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 1983); Romeu v.
Housing Inv. Corp., 548 F. Supp. 1312, 1326 (D.P.R. 1982); Peters v. Township of
Hopewell, 534 F. Supp. 1324, 1333-34 (D.N.J. 1982).
22. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797 (4th Cir. 1983) (deprivation
of liberty alone insufficient to support § 1983 claim); Haygood v. Younger, 718 F.2d
1472, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1147 (7th
Cir.) (deprivation of life alone insufficient to support § 1983 claim), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 491 (1983); Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1983) (deprivation of
liberty states claim under § 1983); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 395 (5th Cir.
1982) (same).
23. See, e.g, State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir.) (failure to
protect against prisoner's suicide does not violate eighth amendment), cert. denied,
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deprivation of liberty. 24 A court facing such a situation could simply
apply Parratt to this negligent deprivation of a liberty interest. If the
state provides adequate postdeprivation remedies, such as a recog-
nized cause of action in negligence, no due process violation has
occurred. 25 Not all courts, however, would follow Parratt under these
circumstances. Courts faced with such situations have held that sub-
stantive due process renders the applicability of the Parratt doctrine
irrelevant to deprivations of life or liberty,2 6 that the doctrine is
inapplicable to such deprivations, 27 or that it applies, but that state
remedies are inadequate to redress such deprivations.2 8
104 S. Ct. 491 (1983); Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337, 340 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981)
(negligent act will support § 1983 cause of action only if accompanied by deprivation
of a federal right, negligent shooting claim dismmissed); Ellsworth v. Mockler, 565
F. Supp. 110, 112-13 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (misconduct in automobile accident does not
give rise to claim under ninth amendment); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698
(1976) (survivors of innocent bystander mistakenly shot by police officer would not
have claim under § 1983).
24. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 796 (4th Cir. 1983); see State Bank v.
Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 491 (1983); Williams
v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981);
Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1555-56 (N.D. Cal. 1983); cf.
Haygood v. Younger, 718 F.2d 1472, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983) (negligently prolonged
detention of prisoner).
25. E.g. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797-99 (4th Cir. 1983); Haygood v.
Younger, 718 F.2d 1472, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983); State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140,
1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 491 (1983); King v. Pace, 575 F. Supp. 1385,
1388 (D. Mass. 1983); Ellsworth v. Mockler, 565 F. Supp. 110, 112-13 (N.D. Ind.
1983); Hickman v. Hudson, 557 F. Supp. 1341, 1347 (W.D. Va. 1983); Flores v.
Edinburg Consol. Indep. School Dist., 554 F. Supp. 974, 978 (S.D. Tex. 1983);
Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F. Supp. 574, 579 (D. Md. 1982); Holmes v. Wampler, 546
F. Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Va. 1982); Peery v. Davis, 524 F. Supp. 107, 108 (E.D. Va.
1981); Eberle v. Baumfalk, 524 F. Supp. 515, 518 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Meshkov v.
Abington Township, 517 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
26. E.g., Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 10 (1st Cir. 1983); Brooks v. School Bd. of
Educ., 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1536-39 (E.D. Va. 1983); Dandridge v. Police Dep't, 566
F. Supp. 152, 154-56 (E.D. Va. 1983); Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F. Supp. 574, 580-81
(D. Md. 1982); Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Va. 1982);
Henderson v. Counts, 544 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (E.D. Va. 1982); Martin v. Covin-
gton, Ky., 541 F. Supp. 803, 804 (E.D. Ky. 1982).
27. E.g., Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 395 (5th Cir. 1982); Wakinekona v.
Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1741
(1983); Lynn v. City of New Orleans Dep't of Police, 567 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D.
La. 1983); Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177, 1180 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982); see Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 293 (D. Colo.
1982).
28. E.g., Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (N.D. Cal.
1983); Clark v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 555 F. Supp. 512, 516-17 (E.D.
Mich. 1982); Flores v. Edinburg Consol. Indep. School Dist., 554 F. Supp. 974, 978
(S.D. Tex. 1983).
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This Note examines the application of the Parratt doctrine to ran-
dom, unauthorized deprivations of life and liberty.2 9 Part I argues
that substantive due process has no place in the context in which the
Parratt doctrine applies and demonstrates further that the logic of the
doctrine applies equally well to deprivations of life or liberty as to
those of property. Part II demonstrates that state remedies are, in
most instances, adequate to redress random and unauthorized depri-
vations of life and liberty. This Note concludes that the Parratt doc-
trine should be applied to deprivations of life and liberty when no
predeprivation hearing is possible. If the postdeprivation remedies
provided by the state are adequate to compensate for such depriva-
tions, the plaintiff has no claim under section 1983.
I. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO AVOID APPLYING THE Parratt Doctrine to
Deprivations of Life or Liberty
A. The Substantive Due Process Rationale
In certain situations, courts have circumvented the Parratt doctrine
by holding that deprivations of life or liberty are violations of substan-
tive due process.30 This approach is premised on the distinction drawn
in Parratt between conduct that deprives a person of a protected
interest but does not amount to a constitutional violation if attended
by adequate postdeprivation remedies, and conduct that in itself vio-
lates a constitutional right.3' Although postdeprivation remedies may
be adequate to redress deprivations of protected interests, they cannot
"cure" the unconstitutional nature of an act which itself amounts to a
constitutional violation.32 For example, in Monroe v. Pape,33 the state
officials' conduct itself violated the fourth amendment prohibition of
29. Deprivations authorized by established state systems are outside of the appli-
cation of the Parratt doctrine, because predeprivation hearings are possible, and thus
required, in such instances. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-37
(1982) (unfair employment practices claim destroyed by operation of state remedial
system); see Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1222 n.2 (4th Cir. 1983); Barnier v.
Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 880-81 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Friedman, supra note 19,
at 572; Smolla, supra note 20, at 859-62.
30. E.g., Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1983); Henderson v.
Counts, 544 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (E.D. Va. 1982); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp.
605, 618-19 (D. Mass. 1982); see Brooks v. School Bd. of Educ., 569 F. Supp. 1534,
1536 (E.D. Va. 1983); Dandridge v. Police Dep't, 566 F. Supp. 152, 156-59 (E.D.
Va. 1983); Sellers v. Roper, 554 F. Supp. 202, 205-06 (E.D. Va. 1982).
31. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536-37; Vance v. Bordenkircher, 533 F. Supp. 429, 434
& n.8 (N.D.W. Va. 1982).
32. Id., at 545-46 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
33. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. New York
City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
1984]
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unreasonable searches and seizures. 34 That constitutional violation
having occurred, section 1983 permitted an action for damages with-
out regard to any existing state remedies. 35 In Parratt, on the other
hand, the respondent relied on the due process clause alone; no sub-
stantive rights were implicated. 36 The Parratt doctrine does not apply
to conduct violating a substantive constitutional right. 37
Thus, a court may, by finding a violation of a substantive constitu-
tional right, circumvent the Parratt doctrine and ignore the issue of
the adequacy of state remedies. Many types of conduct by state offi-
cials, however, fall outside the prohibitions of specific provisions in
the Bill of Rights. 38 Courts faced with allegations of the use of exces-
sive force by police and correction officers have nevertheless been
reluctant to remit plaintiffs to state tort remedies. 39 Instead, these
courts have turned to substantive due process, that "ubiquitous oxy-
moron," 40 as a substantive guarantee of freedom from unnecessarily
harmful conduct by law enforcement officers. 41 In effect, a new con-
34. Id. at 171; see Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536.
35. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183; see Friedman, supra note 19, at 546.
36. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536; see Friedman, supra note 19, at 561 n.111.
37. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536; Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 796 n.3 (4th
Cir. 1983); State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1147 n.5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 491 (1983); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 871-72 (7th Cir. 1983);
Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1222 n.2 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535
(1983); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed,
103 S. Ct. 368 (1982); Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 879 n.20 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); Granet v. Wallich Lumber, 563 F. Supp. 479, 483 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Moorhead v. Government of Virgin Islands, 556 F. Supp. 174, 176 (D.V.I. 1983);
Smolla, supra note 20, at 863; Civil Rights Docket, supra note 20, at 1071-73.
38. See, e.g., Brooks v. School Bd. of Educ., 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (E.D. Va.
1983) (teacher pierced arm of student with pin as corporal punishment); Martin v.
Covington, Ky., 541 F. Supp. 803, 804 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (suspect in drug case forced
by police to solicit homosexual sex); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 614 (D.
Mass. 1982) (false imprisonment).
39. See, e.g., Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1555-56 (N.D.
Cal. 1983); Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Va. 1982); Schiller v.
Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 616-19 (D. Mass. 1982); Howse v. DeBerry Correctional
Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177, 1179-80 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
40. Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.denied, 103 S. Ct.
488 (1982).
41. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 796 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983); Wise v. Bravo,
666 F.2d 1328, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1981); Brooks v. School Bd. of Educ., 569 F.
Supp. 1534, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1983); Dandridge v. Police Dep't, 566 F. Supp. 152, 156
(E.D. Va. 1983); Sellers v. Roper, 554 F. Supp. 202, 204-05 (E.D. Va. 1982); Holmes
v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 505 (E.D. Va. 1982); Henderson v. Counts, 544 F.
Supp. 149, 152-53 (E.D. Va. 1982); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605, 615-19
(D. Mass. 1982); Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177, 1180-81
(M.D. Tenn. 1982); see Friedman, supra note 19, at 558-59; Negligent Injury, supra
note 9, at 1446. Aside from any possible substantive due process right to freedom
from intrusions upon bodily integrity, there is a liberty interest in freedom from such
intrusions that is procedurally protected. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74
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stitutional right, in addition to those enumerated in the Constitution,
has been created.
These courts, basing their reasoning on Rochin v. California,42 have
found the conduct involved so egregious as to "shock the conscience of
the court" and, therefore, to amount to per se violations of the due
process clause. 43 Rochin supports, however, not a right to personal
security and bodily integrity, but rather a right to fundamental fair-
ness in the process leading to a criminal conviction. 44
Rochin was decided prior to the Supreme Court's holding in Mapp
v. Ohio45 that the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule applies to the
states.46 In Rochin, the evidence used to obtain a conviction had been
secured by pumping the suspect's stomach without his consent. 47 Be-
cause Rochin was decided prior to Mapp, the Court could rely only on
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to exclude the evi-
dence. 48 The Court, therefore, examined not the conduct of the police
officers alone, but "the whole course of the proceedings" to ensure
that due process had been accorded the defendant. 49 Examining the
totality of the circumstances, the Court found that "the proceedings
by which the conviction was obtained . . . shock[ed] the con-
science." 50 Admission of evidence procured in such an unsavory man-
(1977); Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 795 (4th Cir. 1983); see Sampley v.
Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 495 n.6 (10th Cir. 1983).
42. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
43. See, e.g., Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 10 (1st Cir. 1983) (unconsented-to
search involving application of carcinogenic substance to skin of suspect); Henderson
v. Counts, 544 F. Supp. 149, 153 & n.3 (E.D. Va. 1982) (beating of suspect by police
officers); Martin v. Covington, Ky., 541 F. Supp. 803, 804 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (suspect
in drug case forced to solicit homosexual sex); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605,
619 (D. Mass. 1982) (assault on suspect during warrantless search); Vance v. Bor-
denkircher, 533 F. Supp. 429, 434 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (prison official failed to
intervene during assault on inmate); see State Bank v. Camic., 712 F.2d 1140, 1147
(7th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 491 (1983); Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d
1220, 1222 n.2 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983).
44. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977); United States v. Lov-
asco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973);
Dandridge v. Police Dep't, 566 F. Supp. 152, 156 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1983); J. Nowak,
supra note 19, at 818 & n.16; Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitu-
tional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 Mich.
L. Rev. 717, 778 (1974); Note, Substantive Due Process Analysis of Nonlegislative
State Action: A Case Study, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 347, 369-70.
45. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46. Id. at 655.
47. 342 U.S. at 166.
48. J. Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure § 17:2, at 508-09 (1982).
49. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17
(1945)).
50. Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
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ner in order to convict the defendent violated the "canons of decency
and fairness" and, therefore, the due process clause. 5'
Since the application of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule
to the states in Mapp, however, the Court no longer finds it necessary
to rely on the canons of decency and fairness as a guarantee of the
right to freedom from unreasonable searches.5 2 The Court has aban-
doned the vague concepts of natural law,53 turning instead to the
protections of specifically enumerated provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Thus, in the context of personal security and bodily integrity, the
Rochin standard of conduct shocking to the conscience has been sup-
planted by the fourth amendment standard of a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.54 Invasions of personal security which do not violate
an individual's expectation of privacy do not violate a constitutional
right. 55 While Rochin may still have some implications for fundamen-
tal fairness in the judicial process, it no longer can be fairly cited as a
guarantee of personal security and bodily integrity.
Nevertheless, three Supreme Court Justices apparently interpret
Rochin to establish a constitutional right of substantive due process.
The Supreme Court, in Baker v. McCollan,56 held that the false
imprisonment of the respondent was not a constitutional violation. 57
Justice Blackmun, concurring, however, cited Rochin as a limitation
on the majority opinion; 58 Baker should not apply to cases of more
offensive police conduct. 59 In Parratt, Justice Powell criticized the
majority's failure to address the substantive due process issue, citing
Rochin as support for "substantive limitations on state action."60 Jus-
tice White, in Parratt, indicated that he also would support a substan-
tive due process approach. 61 Were these three Justices to marshal two
51. Id. at 172-74; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 484, 494 n.6 (1976); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973); see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 113 (1977) (Rochin guarantees fairness of totality of judicial proceedings); Hamp-
ton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 494 n.6 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (same).
52. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring).
53. See J. Nowak, supra note 19, at 454-55, 457, 563 n.4.
54. See Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3323 (1983); Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1980);
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 (1979); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740
(1979); United States v. Rakas, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967); id. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
55. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1980); Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735, 739-40 (1979); United States v. Rakas, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
56. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
57. Id. at 146.
58. Id. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59. Id.
60. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 552-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
61. Justice White concurred with the majority "but with the reservations stated
by [Justice] Blackmun in his concurring opinion." Id. at 545. Justice Blackmun in
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additional votes, a substantive right to personal security and bodily
integrity might be found. Until such time, however, Rochin cannot
fairly be cited as a precedent for such a holding. Lower courts are
unjustified in distinguishing cases of use of excessive force on substan-
tive due process grounds until the Court reverses its present view of
the fourteenth amendment as guaranteeing only procedural regular-
ity.
B. Limiting the Doctrine to Property Deprivations
A few courts limit the doctrine to deprivations of property, focusing
solely on the facts of Parratt2 Because Parratt involved only a prop-
erty deprivation, these courts hold that the doctrine should be limited
to such deprivations.6 3 For example, one court faced with an inten-
tional, unjustified shooting of a person by a police officer simply held
the Parratt doctrine inapplicable to those facts. 64 Limiting the Parratt
doctrine to deprivations of property, however, reveals a rejection of
the fundamental principle of the doctrine."- Because the principle of
the doctrine is that postdeprivation remedies, if adequate to compen-
sate for the deprivation, satisfy due process when no predeprivation
hearing is possible, the doctrine applies to non-property interests as
well .6 The logic of the principle is not affected by the interest vio-
lated.
Parratt again referred to substantive due process, but relied on Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) rather than Rochin.
See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62. See, e.g., Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983); Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp.
1554, 1555-56 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282,
293 n.12 (D. Colo. 1982); Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177,
1180 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
63. Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983); Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282,
293 n.12 (D. Colo. 1982); Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177,
1180 (M.D. Tenn. 1982); see Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1555-
56 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
64. Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 293 n.12 (D. Colo. 1982).
65. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 795-96 (4th Cir. 1983); Haygood v.
Younger, 718 F.2d 1472, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983); King v. Pace, 575 F. Supp. 1385, 1388
n.1 (D. Mass. 1983); Hickman v. Hudson, 557 F. Supp. 1341, 1347 (W.D. Va. 1983);
Clark v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 555 F. Supp. 512, 516 (E.D. Mich. 1982);
Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Va. 1982); Eberle v. Baumfalk,
524 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
66. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 795 (4th Cir. 1983); Haygood v. Younger,
718 F.2d 1472, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983); Hickman v. Hudson, 557 F. Supp. 1341, 1347
(W.D. Va. 1983); Clark v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 555 F. Supp. 512, 516
(E.D. Mich. 1982); Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Va. 1982);
Eberle v. Baumfalk, 524 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see Kupfer, supra
note 9, at 473 n.58; Civil Rights Docket, supra note 20, at 1076-77.
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Some courts maintain, however, that deprivations of life and lib-
erty are more serious than mere property deprivations, and thus re-
quire predeprivation hearings. 67 In Brewer v. Blackwell,68 for in-
stance, the Fifth Circuit held the Parratt doctrine inapplicable to a
false arrest that occurred in violation of established procedures.6 9 That
court recognized that the Supreme Court in Ingraham v. Wright70
applied an analysis similar to Parratt to deprivations of liberty.71 It
distinguished Ingraham, however, on the ground that the depriva-
tions in that case were but slight in comparison to the burden of
predeprivation hearings. 72 On the other hand, deprivations of liberty
such as false arrest or serious physical injury outweigh any additional
burdens imposed by predeprivation hearings. 73 Therefore, the failure
of the state to provide a predeprivation hearing, regardless of its
impossibility, amounted to a denial of due process. 74
Such an analysis rejects the teachings of Parratt. While it is true
that life and liberty may be more important interests than property
and thus should be accorded greater protection, in factual situations
to which the doctrine applies, no greater protection is possible: 75
Because the acts involved are random and unauthorized, no prede-
privation hearing can be had. Therefore, if any process is to be
accorded at all, it must be postdeprivation. Such a postdeprivation
hearing is all that Parratt requires. 76
The finality of any deprivation of life or liberty may also suggest
limiting the Parratt doctrine's applicability to property. Once a plain-
67. See Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 395 (5th Cir. 1982); Wakinekona v.
Olim, 664 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1741
(1983); Friedman, supra note 19, at 574.
68. 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 393-95.
70. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
71. Brewer, 692 F.2d at 395.
72. Id.
73. id.
74. Id.
75. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 795 (4th Cir. 1983); Rutledge v. Arizona
Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981), afJ'd on other grounds sub nom.
Kush v. Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983); Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869,
879 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Hickman v. Hudson, 557 F. Supp. 1341, 1347-48 (W.D. Va.
1983); Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Va. 1982). See supra notes
13-14 and accompanying text.
76. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 795 (4th Cir. 1983); Rutledge v. Arizona
Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981), afj'd on other grounds sub nom.
Kush v. Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983); Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869,
879 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Hickman v. Hudson, 557 F. Supp. 1341, 1347 (W.D. Va.
1983); Clark v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 555 F. Supp. 512, 516 (E.D. Mich.
1982); Holmes v. Wampler, 546 F. Supp. 500, 503 (E.D. Va. 1982). See supra notes
13-14 and accompanying text.
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tiff has been deprived of life or liberty interests, they cannot be
restored. Even under the Parratt doctrine, a hearing must be held
before one is finally deprived of property protected by the due process
clause.7 The Parratt Court, however, reached its result by the defini-
tional device of extending the period over which a property depriva-
tion becomes final. 78 The Court repeatedly stressed that the loss
caused by misconduct of state officials was only an "initial depriva-
tion," before which a hearing was not required. 7 That hearing must
come, however, before the state action is complete, the deprivation
final. 80 If the state provides an opportunity for the plaintiff to be
restored to his former position, due process has been provided, even if
the plaintiff should eventually lose. 8'
This reasoning depends on the ability of the state to restore the
plaintiff to his former position. Accordingly, it has been argued that
the uniqueness of life and liberty preclude applying this reasoning to
those interests. 82 Because property is typically interchangeable, a
damage award obtained under tort law allows a plaintiff to purchase
a substitute for his lost property, restoring him to that former posi-
tion.8 3 When a plaintiff cannot be restored to his former position,
however, the deprivation must be termed final at its initial occur-
rence. At that point, if the property lost cannot be replaced by a
substitute, the plaintiff has been finally deprived of his property
without due process. 84 The constitutional violation is then complete,
and a cause of action should lie under section 1983 even if compensa-
tion is available at state law.85 For example, real property is, by
77. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540.
78. See id. at 540-42; Kupfer, supra note 9, at 468; Smolla, supra note 20, at 873-
75.
79. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539-42.
80. Id. at 540-41; accord Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434
(1982); Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 987 (2d Cir. 1983); Smolla,
supra note 20, at 858.
81. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44.
82. See Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 877 n.16 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Note, Civil Rights-Due Process Requirements for Negligent Property Deprivations,
28 Wayne L. Rev. 1491, 1518-19 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Due Process Require-
ments]; cf. Friedman, supra note 19, at 572-73 (Parratt logic applies only if state
remedy makes plaintiff whole); Kupfer, supra note 9, at 473 n.58 (Parratt should not
apply to life interests).
83. See D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 3.1, at 135 (1973).
84. See Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 987 (2d Cir. 1983); cf.
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 21 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("When a
deprivation is irreversible... the requirement of some kind of hearing before a final
deprivation takes effect is all the more important.").
85. Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 988-89 (2d Cir. 1983). But see
Toteff v. Village of Oxford, 562 F. Supp. 989, 995 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (postdepriva-
tion remedies adequate to redress destruction of real property).
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definition, unique. 86 Once destroyed, it cannot truly be replaced.
Accordingly, such a deprivation would be final at its initial occur-
rence, and should not fall within the application of the Parratt doc-
trine. 17 Similarly, a deprivation of life or liberty would be final at its
first occurrence, and should also fall outside the application of the
Parratt doctrine. 88
Plausible though this argument may be, it was implicitly rejected
by the majority opinion in Ingraham v. Wright.89 The dissent argued
that, because the corporal punishment of students involved could not
be retracted once inflicted, postdeprivation hearings were not ade-
quate to satisfy due process. 90 The majority rejected this argument. 91
Regardless of the ability of the state to restore the lost interest to the
plaintiff, the deprivation is apparently not final until an opportunity
for a hearing is foreclosed, 92 provided that the remedies satisfy due
process.93 It is necessary, therefore, to examine the adequacy of partic-
ular postdeprivation remedies.
II. ADEQUACY OF STATE REMEDIES
There are no doubt situations when no remedy at state law is
adequate to redress a loss of life or liberty. Such a situation would exist
if no tort action is recognized for the conduct producing the loss.
Wrongful confinement to administrative segregation may be such an
instance. While a state may recognize the common-law cause of
action for wrongful imprisonment, it is not clear that this action
would be available to an individual already confined within the gen-
eral prison population. 94 Yet such wrongful confinement may deprive
an individual of a liberty interest protected by the due process
86. Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 987 n.3 (2d Cir. 1983); Losee
v. Morey & Cramer, 57 Barb. 561, 565 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865); D. Dobbs, supra note
83, § 2.5, at 58 (1973); 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 112, at 143-44 (1973).
87. See Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982, 987 (2d Cir. 1983); cf.
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (after-the-fact
hearing insufficient when adjudicative facts are involved, unless full retroactive relief
can be provided); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 20 (1978)
(cessation of utility services "works a uniquely final deprivation" for which state
remedies are inadequate).
88. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 557 (liberty); Kupfer, supra note 9, at 473
n.58 (life); Parameters, supra note 19, at 1246-47 (liberty).
89. 430 U.S. 651, 679-80 (1977).
90. Id. at 696-97 (White, J., dissenting); see id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 679-80.
92. See id. at 677.
93. Id. at 678 & n.46.
94. See Clark v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 555 F. Supp. 512, 517 (E.D.
Mich. 1982).
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clause.9 5 Although certainty of compensation is not required under the
Parratt doctrine,96 certainty of an opportunity for compensation is
required.91 Plaintiffs should not be remitted to uncertain remedies at
state law.98
Ordinarily, however, a remedy will be available at state law. False
imprisonment, assault and battery, wrongful death, and negligence
actions are the most typical causes of action.9 9 The inability of any
monetary award that might result from these actions to make a plain-
tiff whole is "simply irrelevant."'' 00 Aside from the fact that usually
only monetary awards are granted in such instances under section
1983,101 money has always been used at common law to compensate
95. See Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S. Ct. 864, 870-71 (1983); McCrae v. Hankins, 720
F.2d 863, 866-67 (5th Cir. 1983); Clark v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 555 F.
Supp. 512, 517 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Riley v. Johnson, 528 F. Supp. 333, 340 (E.D.
Mich. 1981).
96. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797 (4th Cir. 1983); Groves v. Cox, 559
F. Supp. 772, 776-77 (E.D. Va. 1983); Irshad v. Spann, 543 F. Supp. 922, 927 (E.D.
Va. 1982); see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542 (1981).
97. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797 (4th Cir. 1983); State Bank v. Camic,
712 F.2d 1140, 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 491 (1983); Evans v. City of
Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1982); Groves v. Cox, 559 F. Supp. 772,
776-77 (E.D. Va. 1983); Begg v. Moffitt, 555 F. Supp. 1344, 1361 n.52 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
98. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797-98 (4th Cir. 1983); Brewer
v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 394 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d
510, 514-15 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd.
of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Kush v. Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983); Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp.
1544, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422, 436-37 (1982) (lengthy and speculative tort action only means of redress at state
law).
99. See Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797 (4th Cir. 1983) (negligence);
State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1147 (7th Cir.) (wrongful death action), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 491 (1983); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 394 n.10 (5th Cir.
1982) (false arrest); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 514-15 (7th Cir.) (habeus
corpus, mandamus, and others), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982); Rutledge v.
Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981) (assault and battery),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Kush v. Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983); Roman v.
City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1555 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (wrongful death);
Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 879 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (assault and
battery, false arrest, malicious prosecution); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp. 605,
623 (D. Mass. 1982) (assault and battery, false imprisonment); Haefner v. County of
Lancaster, 520 F. Supp. 131, 132 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (assault and battery, false arrest
and imprisonment, malicious prosecution), aff'd, 681 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 165 (1982); Meshkov v. Abington Township, 517 F. Supp. 1280,
1286 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (negligence).
100. Haygood v. Younger, 718 F.2d 1472, 1481 (9th Cir. 1983).
101. See, e.g., Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1983) (compensatory and
punitive damages awarded); Henderson v. Counts, 544 F. Supp. 149, 150 (E.D.
Mich. 1982) (plaintiff seeking damages and letter of apology); Schiller v. Strangis,
540 F. Supp. 605, 624 (D. Mass. 1982) (plaintiff awarded damages); Vance v.
19841
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
losses of any nature. 02 Monetary judgments are the very basis of
actions at law. 10 3
It has been argued that these tort damage awards are inadequate
because they compensate for injuries to interests different from those
protected by the Constitution. 10 4 Instead, compensation for the consti-
tutional violation itself, quite apart from pecuniary loss, must be
provided.105 The Parratt doctrine, however, is based on the premise
that no constitutional violation has occurred prior to foreclosure of an
opportunity to be heard on a claim. 10 6 For the same reason, policy
arguments advocating easy access to federal venues for protection of
federal rights10 7 are also irrelevant. The federal interest implicated in
these situations is process itself. When the state provides due process,
no federal right is infringed. 08
Finally, some plaintiffs have argued that the unavailability under
state tort law of punitive damages, jury trial, injunctive relief, and
attorney's fees renders the state remedies inadequate. 109 These features
of suit under section 1983 are simply not required by due process.
Section 1983 may have created a uniquely federal cause of action and
remedy, but it did not alter traditional notions of due process." 0
While the requirements of due process cannot be enumerated for all
Bordenkircher, 533 F. Supp. 429, 431 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (plaintiff seeking dam-
ages).
102. See D. Dobbs, supra note 83, §§ 3.1, 7.3 (1973); J. Joyce, Damages § 178
(1903); A. Sedgwick & J. Beale, A Treatise on the Measure of Damages § 8 (9th ed.
1920); J. Stein, Damages and Recovery § 3 (1972).
103. A Sedgwick & J. Beale, supra note 102, § 8; J. Stein, supra note 102, § 3.
104. Rutherford v. United States, 702 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1983); Wilkerson v.
Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 1983); Moorhead v. Government of Virgin
Islands, 556 F. Supp. 174, 176-77 (D.V.I. 1983); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp.
605, 621 (D. Mass. 1982); Friedman, supra note 19, at 573-77.
105. Rutherford v. United States, 702 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1983); Wilkerson v.
Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 1983); Moorhead v. Government of Virgin
Islands, 556 F. Supp. 174, 176-77 (D.V.I. 1983); Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F. Supp.
605, 621 (D. Mass. 1982); Friedman, supra note 19, at 574-75.
106. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540-41; Smolla, supra note 20, at 833. See supra notes 7-
14 and accompanying text.
107. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 573-75; Kupfer, supra note 9, at 471-73;
Smolla, supra note 20, at 833; Civil Rights Docket, supra note 20, at 1066.
108. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44; see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S.
422, 435 (1982); Friedman, supra note 19, at 561 n.111.
109. See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 702 F.2d 580, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1983)
(attorney's fees); Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (punitive damages, injunctive relief); Kupfer, supra note 9, at 473 (injunctive
relief).
110. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543. The Parratt doctrine, by remitting plaintiffs to
state courts for tort remedies, places them in the same position as common-law
plaintiffs. This result is consistent with traditional procedural approaches to due
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cases,"' the most fundamental are notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 12 Parratt explicitly rejected the addition of the relief afforded
under section 1983 to those requirements." 3
While state postdeprivation remedies are thus generally adequate in
theory to redress loss of life and liberty, courts must be assured that
those remedies are adequate in practice before dismissing such claims
under the Parratt doctrine." 4 One of the primary concerns that moti-
vated the enactment of section 1983 was that remedies provided by
state statutes were not in fact available to certain plaintiffs. " 5 Never-
theless, some federal courts have presumed that state courts are as
solicitous of individual rights as are federal courts." 6 In light of the
process. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 679 n.47 (1977) (quoting Monaghan,
Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 431 (1977)); Parameters, supra
note 19, at 1238-40.
111. Mathews v. Edlridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (quoting) Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1267, 1315-17 (1975).
112. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914).
113. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44; State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1147 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 491 (1983); Kumar v. Marion Cty. Common Pleas Ct.,
704 F.2d 908, 910 (6th Cir. 1983); King v. Pace, 575 F. Supp. 1385, 1389-90 (D.
Mass. 1983); Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 565 F. Supp. 869, 879 n.19 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Graham v. Mitchell, 529 F. Supp. 622, 626 (E.D. Va. 1982); Vinson v. Freeman,
524 F. Supp. 63, 66 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
114. Several commentators have stated that a primary goal of the Parratt doctrine
is reduction of the federal caseload. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 553-54; Kupfer,
supra note 9, at 472-73; Civil Rights Docket, supra note 20, at 1036. If a plaintiff can
raise a substantial question of the fact as to the adequacy of state remedies in practice
to redress a deprivation of life or liberty, however, summary judgment will be
precluded and trial required, frustrating that goal. See C. Wright, Federal Courts §
99, at 664 (4th ed. 1983). The same possibility may arise in deprivation of property
cases, however. Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) (state hears and pays
claims under its tort claims procedure). Any inconsistency between the apparent goal
of the doctrine and its actual effect are, therefore, intrinsic to the doctrine, rather
than a result of its application to deprivations of life and liberty.
115. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 176 (1961), overruled in part on other
grounds Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978);
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Osborne); id. at 334
(remarks of Rep. Hoar); id. at 277 app. (remarks of Rep. Porter); id. at 315 app.
(remarks of Rep. Burchard); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5, 12
(1980); Due Process Requirements, supra note 82, at 1493 n.21.
116. See Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 796 (4th Cir. 1983); Palmer v.
Hudson, 697 F.2d 1220, 1223 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983); Ellis
v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 488 (1982).
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policy behind the enactment of section 1983, 117 this presumption is
perhaps invalid. Moreover, Parratt requires that plaintiffs be given an
opportunity to be fully compensated."" For this reason, a federal
court should determine whether state remedies satisfy due process in
practice, as well as in theory. As with any due process question, this
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 9 An unreasonable limi-
tation on the amount of recovery, for example, should render state
postdeprivation remedies inadequate.120 In such situations, a claim of
a violation of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause would
lie under section 1983.121
CONCLUSION
Under the Parratt doctrine, a random and unauthorized depriva-
tion of property by a state official does not constitute a violation of
due process if the state provides adequate postdeprivation remedies.
Although the doctrine has not been uniformly applied to deprivations
of life or liberty, no theoretical obstacles bar such application. Reli-
ance on substantive due process in order to circumvent the doctrine is
unjustified in light of the Supreme Court's procedural approach to due
process. Moreover, neither the finality of life and liberty deprivations,
nor the unavailablity under state law of relief afforded under section
1983, renders such deprivations violative of due process. Because
random, unauthorized deprivations of life and liberty are no more
susceptible of predeprivation hearings than similarly occurring prop-
erty deprivations, the Parratt doctrine should be applied to such
deprivations. In applying the doctrine, however, courts must ascer-
tain whether state remedies are available to the plaintiffs in fact, as
well as in theory. Only then may dismissal under the Parratt doctrine
be warranted.
Harold C. Geary
117. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
118. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 433-37 (1982); Parratt, 451
U.S. at 545 (Stewart, J., concurring); Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 797 (4th
Cir. 1983); State Bank v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140, 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 491 (1983); Evans v. City of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1982).
119. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
120. Cf. Loftin v. Thomas, 681 F.2d 364, 365 (5th Cir.1982) (limitation of
$10,000 on liability for single occurrence of injury or damage to property held
adequate); Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff
claimed $100,000 limitation on recovery for personal injury inadequate).
121. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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